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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GREG NORTON,
PlaintiffRespondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs
J. RALPH MACFARLANE, M.D.,

Case No. 880248

DefendantAppellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on an InterlocutoryAppeal from an Order of the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Weber County, State of Utah, by the Honorable David E.
Roth, District Judge, denying the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can be Granted (defendant's "Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I:
SHOULD THE UTAH SUPREME COURT JOIN THE MAINSTREAM OF
AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT OF ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS, AN ACT CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S OPINION IN
HACKFORD V. UTAH POWER & LIGHT AND WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S
ADOPTION OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AS A GROUND FOR NO-FAULT
DIVORCES?
II:
SHOULD THE UTAH SUPREME COURT JOIN THE MAINSTREAM OF
AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT OF CRIMINAL
CONVERSATION, A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT IS EVEN MORE SUBJECT TO
ABUSE AND TO YIELDING IRRATIONAL RESULTS THAN ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS?

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
30-2-4.

Wife's right to wages-Actions for personal
injury.

A wife may receive the wages for her personal
labor, maintain an action therefor in her own name and
hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute and
defend all actions for the preservation and protection
of her rights and property as if unmarried. There
shall be no right of recovery by the husband on
account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or
for expenses connected therewith, but the wife may
recover against a third person for such injury or
wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall include
expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid
or assumed by the husband.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-2-4 (1984)(emphasis added).
30-3-1.

(3)

Procedure - Residence - Grounds.

Grounds for divorce:

(h) irreconcilable differences of the
marriage:
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-1(3) (Supp. 1988)(emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Amended Complaint in this case alleges that
(1) the defendant alienated the affections of the plaintiffs
wife away from the defendant and (2) the defendant committed
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the tort of criminal conversation by engaging in sexual
relations with the plaintiff's spouse.

The Amended Complaint

seeks $200,000.00 in compensatory damages for the plaintiff's
alleged "emotional distress, mental anguish, embarrassment,
loss of the services and consortium of his wife," and child
care expenses, along with $200,000.00 in punitive damages based
on an allegation of malice.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.
The original Complaint in this case contained three
causes of action.

Record, at 1.

The defendant brought a Rule

12(f) Motion to Strike, Record at 9, and the plaintiff amended
his Complaint to include only the two causes of action for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation, Record at
39, whereupon the motion to strike was denied.

Record at 65.

Next, the defendant filed his Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
Record at 70.

After extensive briefing, the defendant's motion

was argued before Judge David E. Roth, who issued a ruling
denying the motion on the grounds that he was bound by Utah
Supreme Court precedent to recognize the continued existence of
alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions.
Record at 148.

A final order denying the defendant's Rule

12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was filed on June 9, 1988.

The

defendant submitted his Petition for Permission to Appeal from
an Interlocutory Order by the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County, State of Utah, Denying the Defendant's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon
-3-

Which Relief Can Be Granted on June 28, 1988.

Record at 196.

On August 1, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court granted that
Petition, and this appeal followed.

Proceedings in the

District Court were stayed by order of Judge Roth as of August
10, 1988, Record at 193, pursuant to a motion by the defendant
Record at 184.

No answer has been filed to date in this case.

Statement of Facts
No facts have been developed in this case, except the
fact that the plaintiff is suing the defendant under the
theories of alienation of affections and criminal conversation
with specific claims of damages and prayers for relief as
discussed above.

There are, of course, factual allegations in

the Complaint, but no answer has been filed, and therefore, no
facts have been admitted, denied, or otherwise determined.
Since this is an appeal from a denied Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
defendant-appellant recognizes his burden of showing that the
amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted even if all of the allegations contained therein
were assumed to be true for purposes of argument.

This appeal,

therefore, presents a pure question of law as to whether, in
the abstract, causes of action for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation ought to exist in Utah.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant seeks the abolition of the torts of
alienation of affections and criminal conversation in Utah.
Alienation of affections is a judicially-created tort
-4-

that derives from the obsolete view that a husband owns his
wife.

Modern attempts to find a rationale for the tort's

continued viability have been largely devoid of meaningful
content.

The tort lacks a cohesive and defensible public

policy basis that is consistent with the rest of the body of
Utah law.
Many public policy considerations strongly favor the
tort's abolition.

First, and foremost, the tort treats the

so-called "alienated spouse" as a piece of furniture and not a
human being.

The tort assumes that the "alienated spouse" is

incapable of freely choosing upon whom to bestow his or her
affections, and the tort denies the "alienated spouse's" right
to pursue happiness.

Second, alienation of affections actions

have no deterrent effect.

Third, it is exceptionally difficult

to accurately determine damages in alienation of affections
cases.

Fourth, alienation of affections lawsuits are often

brought or threatened for blackmail purposes.

Fifth,

alienation of affections lawsuits are often brought for the
improper purpose of injuring the "alienated spouse" by
attacking somebody who is emotionally close to that
individual.

Sixth, alienation of affections actions are

entirely inconsistent with this court's recent decision in
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co. prohibiting loss of
consortium damages.

Finally, abolishing this archaic tort

would put Utah within the mainstream of American legal
thinking.

Viewed collectively, these policy considerations
-5-

make a compelling argument in favor of abolishing the tort of
alienation of affections in Utah.
The judicially-created tort of criminal conversation
is even more deserving of abolition than alienation of
affections.

It is plagued with almost all of the defects of

alienation of affections.

In addition, criminal conversation

is a virtually strict liability tort, which has led to absurd
results in practice.

Not surprisingly, criminal conversation

has been even more roundly rejected than alienation of
affections by the mainstream legal community.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD JOIN THE MAINSTREAM
OF AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT
OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS, AN ACT CONSISTENT
WITH THE COURT'S OPINION IN HACKFORD V. UTAH
POWER & LIGHT AND WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION
OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AS A GROUND FOR
NO-FAULT DIVORCES.
A.

Alienation of affections is a judicially
created tort in Utah, with no constitutional
or statutory basis, which may therefore be
judicially abolished.

In Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954),
the Utah Supreme Court defined "the essential allegations of
the cause of action for alienation of affections" as:
(a) the fact of marriage, (b) that the
defendant willfully and intentionally, (c)
alienated the wife's affections (d)
resulting in the loss of the comfort,
society, and consortium of the wife, and (e)
(to justify punitive damages) a charge of
malice.

-6-

Wilson, 267 P.2d at 763.

In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207

(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court declared that "the right to
recover for alienation of affections now extends to both
spouses equally," Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1215, and added the
following two "clarifications and elaborations":
First, the requirement that the defendant's
acts must have constituted the 'controlling
cause' of the alienation of affections means
that the causal effect of the defendant's
conduct must have outweighed the combined
effect of all other causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff's spouse and the
alienated spouse. For this purpose, a
defendant is properly chargeable with the
effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures
of the alienated spouse where the defendant
knows or has reason to know that such
acquiescence will damage the marital
relationship.
Second, in trying to make the damages
•proportionate' to the loss of the injured
spouse, the trier of fact should consider
the duration and quality of the marriage
relation, including the extent to which
genuine feelings of love and affections
existed between the spouses prior to the
intervention of the defendant.
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219.
The Nelson court also provided guidance concerning
punitive damages in alienation of affections actions.

The

court stated that in order to meet the prerequisite showing of
malice, "the plaintiff must show 'circumstances of aggravation
in addition to the malice implied by law from the conduct of

-7-

defendant in causing the separation of plaintiff and [his or
her spouse] which was necessary to sustain recovery of
compensatory damages.'"

Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219 (brackets in

original) (quoting Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C.App. 521, 527, 265
S.E.2d 434, 438 (1980)).

Furthermore, any award of punitive

damages must take into consideration a number of factors,
including evidence of the defendant's net worth or income.

Id.

There is no constitutional provision or statute that
authorizes or requires the recognition of alienation of
affections as a cause of action in Utah.
Because alienation of affections is a judicially
created cause of action, without any constitutional or
statutory support, it may be judicially abolished.

When

Washington became the first state to judicially abolish the
tort, it made the following observations:
The action for alienation of a spouse's
affections is a judicially created doctrine
in this state. The action existed at common
law, and was adopted into the jurisprudence
of this state. See, e.g., Beach v. Brown,
20 Wash. 266, 55 P. 46 (1898). The
legislature of this state has not
specifically provided for an action for
alienation of affections.
No doubt has ever been expressed regarding
the courts' power to abolish this judicially
created action for alienation of a spouse's
affections. Our original decision in this
case recognized that 'a rule of law which
has its origins in the common law and which
has not been specifically enacted by the
legislature may be modified or abolished by
the courts when such revision is mandated by
changed conditions.' In the instant case,
-8-

the question of abolition of the action has
been squarely presented to the courts of
this state and, since the action was created
judicially, the courts have the power to
resolve this question.
Wvman v. Wallace, 94 Wash.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452, 453-454 (1980)
(citations omitted).
Beyond having the power to abolish alienation of
affections, this Court has an obligation as the guardian of the
common law to reexamine the continued viability of a tort that
this Court recently called "a historical anomaly."

Hackford v.

Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286 n.3 (Utah 1987).
If alienation of affections is no longer supported by a solid
theoretical foundation, or if public policy considerations
favor abolition of the tort, then the tort ought to be
abolished.

The strength of our common law tradition is

dependent upon the judiciary's constant pruning of obsolete
notions and legal theories to create a healthier and more just
body of law.
B.

Alienation of affections is a tort derived
from the archaic and unacceptable notion
that a wife is the property of her husband.

The history of the tort of alienation of affections
was admirably traced in Justice Durham's detailed concurring
and dissenting opinion in Nelson.

669 P.2d at 1223-1227.

Originally, the tort was derived from the notion that under the
medieval concept of social status, when a woman married she
lost her legal and spiritual existence as an individual,

-9-

becoming instead a part of her husband and one of his
chattels.

As one modern commentator put it:
Early courts were exclusively
controlled by men, and the origin of
alienation of affections must necessarily be
considered with that in mind. At common
law, a wife was more than a "mere chattel;"
she was a man's most prized possession.
Therefore, enticing away a man's wife was
perhaps the ultimate tort.

Comment, Alienation of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism, 13
Wake Forest L.Rev. 585-588 (1977).

The concept that a wife has

no separate legal identity and is merely the property of her
husband is entirely inconsistent with modern legal thinking.
That point was admitted by the majority in Nelson v. Jacobsen,
and the majority put forth the following as an acceptable
modern rationale for the tort:
While the archaic notion of "wife as
chattel" may have served as the historical
foundation for this cause of action, its
modern context bears little resemblance to
that notion. The right to recover for
alienation of affections now extends to both
spouses equally. See, e.g., Heist v. Heist,
46 N.C.App. 521, 265 S.E.2d 434 (1980);
Burch v. Goodson, 85 Kan. 86, 116 P.2d 216
(1911). Moreover, an action for alienation
of affections is no longer based on the
premise that either spouse constitutes the
"property" of the other, but on the premise
that each spouse has a valuable interest in
the marriage relationship, including its
intimacy, companionship, support, duties,
and affection. Note, "The Case for
Retention of Causes of Action for
Intentional Interference with the Marital
Relationship", 48 Notre Dame Law, 426 430-31
(1972).
-10-

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1215 (emphasis in the
original).

Interestingly, Nelson is the first Utah case to

make the tort of alienation of affections available to both
spouses,

Wilson v. Oldroyd talks specifically in terms of

alienation of "the wife's affections."

Wilson, 267 P.2d at 763.

In Nelson, the majority opinion, by rejecting the
existing historical "wife as chattel" basis for the tort, in
effect created a new tort based on the asserted "valuable
interest in the marriage relationship".
1215 (emphasis in the original).

Nelson 669 P.2d at

As the next section of this

brief demonstrates, although that justification may be facially
appealing, it is fatally flawed.
C.

The rationalization that "each spouse has a
valuable interest in the marriage
relationship" is inaccurate when considered
in light of Utah law.

The statement by the majority in Nelson v. Jacobsen
that "each spouse has a valuable interest in the marriage
relationship , including its intimacy, companionship, support,
duties and affection" may seem at first glance appealing.

If

the statement is true as a general matter of Utah law, then
alienation of affections actions simply connote one of many
possible ways in which that incorporeal interest may be
invaded, leading to liability.

In effect, alienation of a

spouse's affections would simply be a means by which the tort

-11-

of interfering with a party's marriage relationship might be
conducted.
The problem with the foregoing theory is that there is
no general tort of "interference with the marriage
relationship" under Utah law.

If there is, and if each spouse

truly has a generally protectable interest in the marriage
relationship itself, then any wrongful act that damages the
marriage relationship should be actionable, provided that basic
tests of causal proximity can be met.

Thus, a wide range of

injuries to spouse "A" should result in a cause of action in
favor of spouse "B" for the harm caused to spouse "B's"
interest in the marriage relationship.

For example, if

Defendant negligently injures Husband in a car accident, then
Wife ought to be able to sue Defendant for his negligent
interference with her interest in her marriage relationship
with Husband.

It is reasonably foreseeable that when a

defendant negligently causes a car accident, the defendant may
injure somebody else, and that the injured party may be
married, and that the injuries may damage the injured party's
spouse's marriage relationship.

Thus, causality is established.

Under Utah law, however, an action by Wife to recover
for the harm to her marriage (and in particular its "intimacy,
companionship, support, duties, and affection," to quote
Nelson) caused by Defendant's negligent injury of Husband in a
car accident would be deemed a suit for loss of consortium
damages.

Loss of consortium actions are explicitly barred by
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this courts very recent decision in Hackford v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987).
Countless other examples could be given, but the
foregoing demonstrates that there is no general legally
cognizable and protectable interest in the marriage
relationship as such under Utah law.

Indeed, under all of Utah

law there appear to be only two conditions where the alleged
"interest in the marriage relationship" is legally
enforceable.

One area is in wrongful death cases, as provided

by Article XVI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution; the other
area is in alienation of affections and/or criminal
conversation actions.
The majority in Nelson, therefore, could not have been
referring to a generally protected "interest in the marriage
relationship," since no such interest exists; rather, they were
referring to a purported interest in each spouse not to have
the marriage relationship disrupted by the attempts of third
parties to alienate the affections of the other spouse.
Phrased that way, however, the rationale supporting Nelson v.
Jacobsen turns out to be a tautology.

In effect, Nelson says

that there should be a cause of action for alienation of
affections because each spouse in a marriage has a right not to
have the other spouse's affections alienated.

Such reasoning

does not provide a sound analytical basis for the continued
existence of a cause of action that has been widely rejected by
the majority of American jurisdictions.
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D.

The tort of alienation of affections ignores
the "alienated spouse's" status as a human
being who should be free to change his or
her own emotions and affections.

Our Declaration of Independence contains these words,
which form the core of America's concept of jurisprudence:

"We

hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness."
2 (U.S. 1776).

The Declaration of Independence, para.

Those unalienable rights extend to the key

non-party figure in alienation of affections actions, the
so-called "alienated spouse."

Merely because a couple is

married does not give one spouse the right to hold the other
spouse's emotions hostage, or to prevent the other spouse from
achieving a state of happiness.

Yet that is precisely the

effect of alienation of affections actions.

The very existence

of the tort means that a spouse must conscientiously avoid
relationships that could expand the spouse's horizons in a way
that might damage the marriage relationship, even at the
expense of the spouse's own happiness.

Otherwise, the other

participant in the relationship may become a defendant in an
alienation of affections lawsuit.
One essential point to remember is that alienation of
affections actions have nothing to do with sex or sexual
relationships per se.

Rather, the tort lies in all cases where

-14-

the defendant is aware of the existence of the marriage, and
yet willfully and intentionally alienates the plaintiff's
spouse's affections away from the plaintiff.
at 763.

Wilson, 267 P.2d

Even the "intentional and willful" standard is not

hard and fast since "a defendant is properly chargeable with
the effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures of the
alienated spouse where the defendant knows or has reason to
know that such acquiescence will damage the marital
relationship."

Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1219.

Thus, alienation of affections actions can arise in
many anomalous and unfair situations.

For example, an

individual's parents, who bore and raised that individual as a
child, clearly have at least as much of an interest in the
affections of an individual as that individual's spouse.

Yet

if, for example, spouse "A's" parents and spouse "B" fervently
hate each other, with the result that spouse "A" eventually
divorces spouse "B," spouse "B" can sue spouse "A's" parents
for alienating spouse "A's" affections.
Mass. 603, 222 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1967).

Poulos v. Poulos, 351
But cf. Bradford v.

Bradford, 165 Or. 297, 107 P.2d 106, 109 (1940) (recognizing a
parental privilege to act in good faith for the best interest
of the child).

Of course, the law recognizes no parallel cause

of action in "A's" parents if, as a result of their bickering
with spouse "B," spouse "B" chooses to move the family across
the country from the parents-in-law and pressures spouse "A"
into ostracizing spouse "A's" parents.
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There are also situations in which an individual may
attempt to intentionally alienate a spouse in order to protect
that spouse.

Our courts and newspapers are full of tragic

stories where an abused spouse (almost invariably the wife)
refused to believe that she should leave her husband until
finally great physical injury or death had occurred.

Often the

physical injury extends beyond the abused spouse to the
couple's children.

Yet, a social worker who sets out to

disillusion the wife of the notion that she and her children
somehow deserve to be beaten, undoubtedly knows and intends
that his or her actions may lead to divorce or separation.
Under such a set of circumstances, the social worker who is
trying to prevent serious injury to mother and children has
committed the tort of alienation of affections under existing
Utah law.

Nor is the problem unique to social workers;

ministers, professors, friends, anybody who is aware that by
their actions they may change an individual's perception of the
world, and who desire that result even though it may have
adverse impact on the individual's marriage, is a proper target
for an alienation of affections lawsuit.

For example, while

decisions involving ministers have recognized a general
religious privilege, see Radecki v. Shuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d
92, 361 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1976), courts also find that the
privilege does not cover cases that have crossed the fine line
between acceptable religious zeal and an improper motive.

See

Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
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cause of action against minister who advised wife to leave her
husband and who harassed the family publicly); Bear v. Reformed
Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (1975) (use of
shunning can constitute alienation of affections); Carrieri v.
Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d. 132, 136-137 (1966).
Even allowing alienation of affections actions in the
more stereotypical case—where a third person develops an
emotional or romantic bond with a spouse, thereby damaging the
spouse's marriage—denies the emotional independence of that
spouse.

The tort presupposes that the "alienated spouse" is

incapable of exercising his or her free will in determining to
whom he or she will direct emotional or romantic energies.

As

Justice Stewart correctly pointed out in his opinion in Nelson:
We do not live in a day, if ever there
were one, when male or female Casanovas cast
a spell that all but nullifies the willpower
of a member of the opposite sex. Persons
who have been married do not generally fall
prey to overwhelmingly seductive powers of
another like some inert piece of iron drawn
inexorably into the ever stronger field of
power of a magnet. The affection of the
married persons for each other is usually
alienated by their own conduct or misconduct,
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1222 (Stewart J. concurring and
dissenting).

If marriage is no longer meeting the emotional

needs of one spouse, and that spouse desires to find emotional
and romantic comfort elsewhere, a lawsuit for alienation of
affections will do nothing to restore the weak marriage, but
will only interfere with the "alienated spouse's" new found
happiness.
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E.

The analogy sometimes drawn between
alienation of affections actions and
interference with contractual relationships,
or prospective economic relationships, is
inaccurate.

A common defense of alienation of affections as a tort
is that it is really very similar to such well recognized torts
as interference with contractual relationships and interference
with prospective economic relationships.

Actually, alienation

of affections is very different from those torts.
The tort of interference with a contractual
relationship arises, by definition, out of a contract.

In a

normal contract, each contracting party is bound to do
specified acts, and neither party may unilaterally terminate
those commitments.

Liability for interference with a

contractual relationship occurs when a third party
intentionally induces one of the contracting parties to breach
the contract.

The third party's liability is derived from, and

directly connected with, the inherent liability of the party
that breached the contract.
In a marriage, by contrast, the spouses have very
limited legal obligations to each other.

Neither spouse is

legally obliged to give any comfort, to or have any affection
for, the other spouse.

A spouse cannot sue in court to force

the other spouse to give affection, or to pay damages for the
lack of affection.

Yet alienation of affections holds a third
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party liable for inducing a spouse to stop giving the comfort
and affection that the spouse was never legally obligated to
give.

Unlike interference with a contractual relationship,

where both the inducer and the actor (breaching party) are
equally liable, in alienation of affections the inducer is held
liable while the actor (the alienated spouse who has withheld
affection) is not liable for his or her actions.
Not only is the analogy between alienation of
affections and interference with the contractual relationship
invalid, the analogy between marriage itself and a contractual
relationship, once quite valid, is no longer so today.

Even

the term "marriage contract," which implies a legal right to
enforce the continued existence of a marital relationship, is
no longer accurate.

When the Utah Legislature adopted the

concept of no-fault divorces in 1987, it rejected the notion
that a spouse has an enforceable property right in the
continued existence of his or her marriage.
Historically the "marriage contract" was recognized as
being so strong that early divorces were very difficult to
obtain.

The plaintiff was required to show that the defendant

had breached the marriage vows first, by some fault of the
defendant's, before the plaintiff could be released from his or
her further marital obligations to the defendant.

Otherwise,

the defendant had a right to the continued existence of the
marital relationship.

A court could only terminate the marital

relationship upon a finding that the defendant had "breached"
the "marriage contract."
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The concept of fault as a requisite for divorce, and
the corresponding concept of the defendant's right to prevent
the divorce from taking place by showing that there had been no
fault, continued in theory in Utah law until the passage of the
Grounds for Divorce Law of 1987.

Chapter 106, Laws of Utah

1987 (now codified as Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-1(3)(h)(Supp.
1988)).

Although the grounds for divorce had been

progressively relaxed over the years, until that law was passed
it was still technically possible for a defendant to prevent a
divorce by claiming that he or she had not committed any acts
of physical or mental cruelty (to use the most common example)
and that the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to a
divorce.

In theory, if the defendant treated the plaintiff

with kindness and had not committed any act that gave rise to a
ground for divorce, the plaintiff could not obtain the divorce,
even if the plaintiff despised the defendant.
The introduction of no-fault divorces substantially
changed the nature of the marriage relationship in Utah.

By

allowing a divorce on the "grounds" of irreconcilable
differences, the legislature allowed the plaintiff to terminate
the marriage regardless of the fault or behavior of the
defendant.

It is impossible to defend against a charge of

irreconcilable differences; the mere act of denying the
allegation in an answer constitutes proof of the irreconcilable
nature of the differences between the parties.

A system of

divorce law based on irreconcilable differences eliminates the
-20-

right of one spouse to insist on the continuation of the
"marital contract" so long as that spouse does nothing to
breach it.
The marital relationship has gone from one of binding
contract to one of a gift freely given, which may be freely
withdrawn.

There is no cause of action for interference with a

prospective gift or for causing the failure of the giftee to
give the gift; there should no longer be an action for
alienation of affections.
If marriage resembles any sort of a contract, it is
most similar to a contract that is terminable at will.

There

is no cause of action for merely inducing a party to an "at
will" contract to legally terminate, rather than breach, that
contract.

Since a spouse can legally terminate his or her

affection for another spouse at any time, there should be no
cause of action for inducing a spouse to do so.
The analogy between alienation of affections actions
and the tort of interference with a prospective economic
relationship is even more far fetched than the analogy to the
tort of interference with a contract.
Interference with a prospective economic relationship
contains specific safeguards that are not present in alienation
of affections actions.

The leading Utah case on intentional

interference with prospective economic relations lists the
elements of the tort as follows:

"...

in order to recover

damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
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intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."

Leigh

Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982)
(emphasis added).

The "improper purpose or improper means"

test provides a critical safeguard that is lacking in
alienation of affections actions.
The "improper purpose" option turns on motive.

For

example, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant drove
customers away from the plaintiff's business, the improper
purpose test "will be satisfied where it can be shown that the
actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff."
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307.

On the other hand, if the

defendant's purpose in alienating the plaintiff's customers was
to gain those customers for the defendant's own business, that
is a proper purpose which the law will allow.

id. at 307-308.

If the analogy with alienation of affections were valid, then
alienating a spouse's affections for the purpose of gaining
those affections to oneself, or for the purpose of helping that
spouse (much as a consumer advocacy group can properly
interfere with a business's prospective economic relationships
by pointing out the defects in the business's products) should
not constitute an improper purpose, and absent an improper
means of employment, should not be tortious.
In Leigh Furniture, the Court defined "improper means"
as follows:
-22-

The alternative requirement of improper
means is satisfied where the means used to
interfere with a party's economic relations
are contrary to law, such as violations of
statutes, regulations, or recognized
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or
tortious in themselves and hence are clearly
'improper' means of interference unless
those means consist of constitutionally
protected activity, like the exercise of
First Amendment rights. 'Commonly included
among improper means are violence, threats
or other intimidation, deceit or
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded
litigation, defamation, or disparaging
falsehood.' Means may also be improper or
wrongful because they violate 'an
established standard of trade or profession.'
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308 (citations omitted).

Justice

Stewart argued in Nelson that an "improper means" test based on
the existence of "power relationships" should be adopted:
There are those in special positions of
power, status or authority who may illicitly
use sex to satisfy their own passions or for
otherwise improper means. There are any
number of such relationships, i.e.,
professors and students; physicians and
patients; psychiatrists, psychoanalysts or
psychologists and clients; and employers and
employees. Those who use positions of power
or authority for the purpose of obtaining
sexual favors and produce an alienation of
affections between the one in an inferior
position and his or her spouse, abuse and
overreach any legitimate power they may have.
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1222 (Stewart, Justice, concurring and
dissenting).

His suggestion was, however, rejected by the

majority in Nelson.1 Because alienation of affections actions
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lack the important safeguard of an "improper purpose/improper
means" test, an analogy between that tort and the tort of
interference with a prospective economic relationship is
inaccurate.
F.

Alienation of affections actions do not
deter the conduct they proscribe.

When the Idaho Supreme Court abolished that state's
cause of action for alienation of affections, it noted that
"[n]ever has there been any documentation that the existence of
the action actually protects marriages."

O'Neil v. Schuckardt,

112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (1986).

Indeed, the Court can

take judicial notice of the fact that divorce rates have
increased significantly in Utah since the leading alienation of
affections decision of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d
759 (1954).
An alienation of affections suit is unlikely to save
the specific marriage at issue.

As the O'Neil court points

out, "once suit has been brought, it notifies the public that
the marriage is unstable, embarrasses the spouses and their
children, and adds more tension to the family relationship."
O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698.
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that the
existence of alienation of affections actions currently serves
any societal purpose in discouraging third party interferences
with marital relationships.

Such a deterrent effect is highly
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unlikely for three reasons.

First, there are very few

alienation of affections lawsuits.

Indeed, this Court has not

upheld an award of damages in an alienation of affections
lawsuit since the 1950fs.

(The verdict in Nelson was set

aside, and the case remanded for a new trial, on other
grounds.

669 P.2d at 1220.)

There are undoubtedly an

extremely large number of individuals in this state who could
be sued for alienation of affections.

The very low ratio of

lawsuits brought to potential lawsuits in existence serves to
nullify any deterrent effect the tort might have.
The second reason the tort lacks a deterrent effect is
the very limited public awareness of the tort.

Most people

know that you can be sued for negligence, or for breaching a
contract.

The archaic tort of alienation of affections,

however, is probably not well known to the public at large, and
perhaps to the bar.
The third reason for the lack of a deterrent effect
has to do with human nature.

Potential future alienation of

affections defendants rarely act in a coldly rational way.
Usually they don't do a legal analysis of their proposed
actions; rather they tend to operate on an emotional plane.
"The unplanned nature of the tort, at least where sexual
activities are involved, makes the threat of any damage suit
unlikely to deter the culpable conduct that has allegedly
interfered with the marriage."

O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698.
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A new decision by this court affirming the existence
of the tort is unlikely to increase its deterrent effect.
Admittedly, the number of alienation of affections lawsuits
could skyrocket.

After two recent decisions reinforce the

legitimacy of the tort, it could be legal malpractice for a
lawyer to fail to discuss the possibility of an alienation of
affections lawsuit in any divorce case where a third party's
actions may have contributed to the dissolution of the
marriage.

There were some 8,985 divorces in Utah in 1987

(according to John Brockert, Director, Bureau of Health
Statistics, Utah Department of Health), and undoubtedly a large
percentage of those divorces involved intentional interference
of some sort by a third party in the marriage, so it is not
illogical to assume that thousands of new lawsuits could result
from a decision affirming the tort's viability.
Likewise, it is fair to assume that the existence of
large numbers of alienation of affections suits, coupled with
media attention, could result in greater public awareness of
the tort's existence.
Reaffirmation of the tort will not create a meaningful
deterrent effect, however, because the third obstacle to
creating such an effect, human nature, will not be changed by
this court's decision.

People have been interfering in other

people's marriages since the concept of marriage was first
created.

Undoubtedly, ancient Samaritans told in-law jokes,

and sexual infidelity certainly predates the Bible.
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Throughout

the ages, societies have used any number of punishments,
including death, in attempts to deter such interference, but
without avail.

There is no reason to believe that even an

active and vital tort of alienation of affection will succeed
in overcoming human nature,
G.

The practical problems associated with
alienation of affections actions argue
strongly for the tort's abolition.

The most important practical problem with alienation
of affections is establishing a meaningful measure of damages.
The majority opinion in Nelson states that "the injury in this
action seems no more 'intangible* and no more difficult to
value than pain and suffering in a personal injury action or
the loss of comfort, society, and companionship in an action
for wrongful death."

Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1217.

Appellant

respectfully disagrees with that assertion, and submits that it
is subject to examination.
"Pain and suffering" damages are measured from a
common point of reference, a baseline of being free from pain
that jurors can all agree upon.

The duration of the pain is

usually clearly established by the defendant's own testimony or
by expert testimony.

The degree of pain, although subjective,

can at least be placed in a hierarchy of common human
experience with pain that does not depend on the individual
juror's value system, sense of morality, or religious beliefs.
A broken leg, for instance, is generally more painful than a
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minor skin laceration.

A jury, therefore, can usually

determine if an individual has suffered pain, the duration of
that pain, and can make a least a hierarchical estimate of the
degree of that pain relative to other kinds of pain.
By contrast, in an alienation of affections case, the
jury must start by making a guess as to the quality of the
marriage before the defendant's actions, then must determine
the quality of the marriage after those actions, and then must
determine how much of the decline in the quality of the
marriage, if any, is properly attributable to the defendant's
actions.

(Rarely in pain and suffering cases is the plaintiff

responsible for the infliction of a portion of the pain.)

What

constitutes a "good marriage," or damage to a marriage, is
highly personal and subjective; it depends on each juror's
unique religious and moral value system, unlike the question of
what constitutes not being in pain.

Likewise, while most

personal injury victims are in a relatively pain free condition
before the injury is inflicted, most marriages are far from
perfect at the point at which a third party's interference has
any effect on the marriage relationship.
The analogy between measuring damages in wrongful
death actions and in alienation of affections suits, while much
closer than the analogy to "pain and suffering" damages, is
still flawed.

This Court would have to allow the continued

existence of wrongful death actions even if it were convinced
that the damages awarded in those cases were essentially guess
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work, because the cause of action for wrongful death is
constitutionally mandated under Utah law.
XVI, § 5.

Utah Const. Art.

Also, the mere fact that wrongful death cases deal

with death makes the damages in those cases easier to
calculate.

Most importantly, there is no allegation in the

typical wrongful death case that the plaintiff had something to
do with the loss of consortium or that the spouse would have
been "alienated" anyway; the loss of consortium is both final
and totally causally related to the defendant's alleged wrong
doings.
Another practical problem associated with the tort of
alienation of affections is the potential for blackmail.

The

prospective plaintiff can easily demand a "settlement" from the
prospective defendant in order to prevent the plaintiff from
making public allegations.

The unusually high susceptibility

of alienation of affections actions to blackmail is well
recognized.

See, Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1227 (Durham Justice,

concurring and dissenting); O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698.
Another problem with alienation of affections actions
is that they are often brought for the improper purpose of
indirectly attacking the "alienated spouse," rather than, or in
addition to, "getting even" with the defendant.

"The primary

motive in bringing the action is often for the plaintiff to
vindicate himself and gain revenge on the other spouse and the
defendant."

O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698.

Allowing such indirect

attacks on the "alienated spouse's" exercise of free will
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further erodes that person's individual rights and identity.
In many cases, the "alienated spouse" and the defendant have
subsequently established a perfectly legal relationship.
Alienation of affections in such circumstances is little more
than a judicially enforceable tool to allow the plaintiff to
interfere with the new and successful relationship under the
guise of seeking damages for the harm done to the old, failed
relationship.
Taken individually, the problems with proving damages,
the blackmail potential of alienation of affections suits, or
the tendency of such suits to be used for improper purposes may
not warrant abolition of the tort.

Likewise, other practical

difficulties with the tort, such as the possibility of
collusive lawsuits, and the conflict between alienation of
affections and the right to privacy, probably do not
individually warrant abolition of the tort.

Indeed, the

majority opinion in Nelson considered most of the foregoing
arguments and individually dismissed each argument.
669 P.2d at 1215-1218.

Nelson,

Taken collectively, however, the

arguments make a strong case for the abolition of alienation of
affections.

That is particularly true in light of the weak,

almost non-existent, rationalizations put forward in favor of
the tort's continued vitality.

There comes a point at which a

potential cause of action has so many problems associated with
it that it should not exist, notwithstanding that each problem
individually might be surmounted or ignored were it the only
problem with the tort.
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H.

Across the nation, the law has increasingly
come to reject alienation of affections as a
cause of action.

Given the serious problems with the tort, it is not
surprising that state legislatures, state courts, and legal
scholars have increasingly come to reject alienation of
affections.
A comparison of the fourth edition of William
Prosser*s famous volume on the law of torts with the fifth
edition gives a literal hornbook example of the change in legal
thinking that occurred between 1971 and 1984.

The fourth

edition of Prosser's work, published in 1971, strongly
questioned the desirability of abolishing alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, and seduction as torts.

See

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 124 (4th ed. 1971).
The fifth edition, published in 1984, a year after
Nelson v. Jacobsen, however, takes a decidedly different
approach.

In the exact spot where Prosser had previously

criticized legislative abolition of alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, and seduction, the fifth edition has
replaced that language with the following quote:
The trend against [alienation of affections
and criminal conversation] actions has moved
slowly, but in the light of increased
personal emphasis in our society and
personal choice, the de-criminalization of
sexual activities in many states, and
skepticism about the role of law in
protecting feelings and enforcing highly
personal morality, it seems doubtful that
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the trend will be reversed. It is, however,
possible to draw distinctions, and to
provide relief where the interference with
family relations is accomplished by means of
some independent tort, such as fraud or
defamation, or where the defendant has taken
advantage of a person incapable of full
consent, such as a child or an incompetent.
It may well be that the accommodation of the
conflicting ideals of personal freedom on
the one hand and stable family life on the
other will in the future be accommodated
along these lines rather than by retaining
the pure common law actions.
W. Page Keeton, ed. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts,
§ 124 (5th ed. 1984) (W. Prosser died in 1972).
The change in mainstream legal thinking, away from the
continued existence of alienation of affections and criminal
conversation actions, is evident not only in the most recent
edition of Prosser and Keeton on Torts, but also in recent law
review writing.

Since the Nelson opinion, both the University

of Utah Law Review and the Brigham Young University Law Review
have come out with articles that criticize the reasoning in
Nelson and strongly attack the tort of alienation of affections
itself.

Note, Alienation of Affections, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 215

(1985); C. Haws, Power Abuse as a Basis for Alienation of
Affections:
(1985).

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 1985 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 183

It is fair to say that the trend of recent legal

commentators is distinctly against the continued existence of
causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation.
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A good hornbook is not so much a statement of what the
author believes the law ought to be, as it is an analysis of
what the law is and where the law is going.

Viewed in that

light, the change between the fourth and fifth edition of
Prosser on Torts reflects the change in mainstream
jurisprudential thinking between 1971 and 1984.

For instance,

in 1971, no court had judicially abolished alienation of
affections actions, although Louisiana, because of its unique
code law based legal system, had never recognized the action.
See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
Between 1980 and the publication of Prosser's fifth edition in
1984, Iowa and Washington did judicially abolish the cause of
action.

Funderman v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981);

Wvman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).

Since

then, our sister state of Idaho, in the O'Neil decision, has
joined the trend towards judicial abolition of alienation of
affections.

In addition, the majority of states and the

District of Columbia have abolished alienation of affections by
statute,2 or abolished such actions except for insignificant
exceptions,3 or have limited such actions to injunctive relief.4
All told then, alienation of affections actions for
damages are not generally maintainable in at least thirty-five
states.

Utah should join the mainstream of American legal

thinking, which increasingly favors abolition of this obsolete
tort.
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I.

This Court's recent decision in Hackford v.
Utah Power & Light Co. denying recovery for
loss of consortium damages is in direct and
irreconcilable conflict with the continued
existence of alienation of affections
actions.

The principal elements of damages in an alienation of
affections suit are loss of the alienated spouse's support,
companionship, love and affection.

Those types of damages have

been recognized by this Supreme Court as falling under the
rubrick of "loss of consortium damages."
Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972).

Ellis v. Hathaway, 27
See also Black v.

United States, 263 F. Supp. 470, 476 (D. Utah 1967).

Numerous

Utah Supreme Court cases recognize that the Married Woman's Act
of 1898, Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4, which states in part that
"[t]here shall be no right of recovery by the husband on
account of personal injury or wrong to his wife", prohibits an
action for loss of consortium damages (except in wrongful death
cases where they are specifically authorized by Article XVI,
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution).

See e.g., Tias v.

Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1978); Ellis, 493 P.2d at 986;
Black, 263 F. Supp. at 471-80 (federal court trying to
determine state law before first Utah decision).

Any doubt

that may have existed about the issue was put to rest by this
Court's recent decision in Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987).
It is extremely difficult to see a theoretical
justification for allowing loss of consortium damages in
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alienation of affections actions, while not allowing them in
other tort actions.

Since 47 states recognize a loss of

consortium action as a general principle of law, Hackford, 740
P.2d at 1288 (Howe, J. concurring in the result), and since
only a handful of states appear to have a viable cause of
action for alienation of affections, Utah is probably unique in
allowing the collection of loss of consortium damages in
alienation actions, but not in normal tort actions.
anomalous result is simply unsupportable.

That

See Hackford, 740

P. 2d at 1293 (Durham and Stewart, JJ. dissenting).

A

plaintiff whose spouse was intentionally maimed and crippled by
the defendant would have no cause of action for loss of
consortium damages, while a plaintiff whose spouse had allowed
or even encouraged an alienation of his or her affections "by"
the defendant would be entitled to loss of consortium damages.
Justice Zimmerman recognized the inequity in that
situation in his majority opinion in Hackford, but apparently
because the issue of the validity of a cause of action for
alienation of affections was not before the court, he could do
nothing to resolve the conflict.

Justice Zimmerman's opinion

did point out, however, that "[a]s for this Court's recognition
of the alienation-of-affections cause of action in Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), its continued existence is
a historical anomaly and should not be relied on to create new
causes of action."

Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1286 n.3.

Now is the

time for the Court to eliminate the "historical anomaly."
-35-

The 1987 Hackford case clearly illustrates both this
Court's intention to disallow a general cause of action based
on loss of consortium damages, and the conflict between that
position and the continued viability of a cause of action for
alienation of affections.

To allow a claim for alienation of

affections based on loss of consortium damages, while such a
claim is unequivocally denied to all other tort claimants
(except in wrongful death actions, pursuant to the Utah
constitutional provision) would be highly inequitable.
Justice Howe, in his concurring opinion in Hackford,
distinguished loss of consortium from alienation of affections
actions as follows:
The comparison made by the plaintiff between
an action for loss of consortium and an
action for wrongful death or for alienation
of affections is unavailing. Actions for
wrongful death are protected by the Utah
Constitution, art. XVI, § 5, and were
unaffected by the legislative enaction of
§ 30-2-4. Actions for alienation of
affections are not derivative from a tort
committed on the alienated spouse. The
latter is not injured at all. Rather,
alienation of affections arises from a tort
committed on the non-alienated spouse by
interference with his or her marriage
contract. An action by a husband for
alienation of affections such as Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), can in
no wise be said to be brought "on account of
personal injury or wrong to his wife," as
prohibited by § 30-2-4.
Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1287 (Howe, J., concurring in the result)
That argument is based on a questionable premise,
namely that the "alienated spouse" is never injured at all.
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There are undoubtedly many occasions on which the "alienated
spouse" is not injured, or has even benefited by being
"alienated."

On the other hand, that is not always the case.

Sometimes the "alienated spouse" is an unwilling participant in
the events causing the alienation.

An example would be the

type of situation discussed by Justice Stewart in his Nelson
opinion, where a person in a position of power uses that power
to make sexual advances and obtain sexual favors from an
unwilling victim.

Likewise, there are many situations where

the spouse may have been a voluntary and even enthusiastic
participant in the actions causing an alienation, but
subsequently came to regret his or her actions and the damage
that those actions had on his or her marriage.
Even if the "alienated spouse" were never injured, it
does not follow that the lack of such an injury should affect
the plaintiffs right to recover damages.

There is no logical

reason why the plaintiffs ability to recover damages for the
loss of support, companionship, love and affection of the
plaintiffs spouse (who actually suffers the physical injury or
alienation) should turn on whether the plaintiff's spouse was
herself injured.

See Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1291 (Durham J.,

dissenting) (action for loss of consortium, although nominally
derivative, is actually an action for direct harm to the
plaintiff).

Justice Howe's argument would be analogous to

saying that the right of a passenger in a vehicle to recover
for damages caused in an accident is dependent on whether the
driver of the vehicle was able to escape injury.
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Under Utah law, loss of consortium damages should be
denied pursuant to Hackford regardless of whether the
plaintiff's spouse withheld support, companionship, love and
affection from the plaintiff due to having been physically
injured by the defendant or due to the defendant's alienating
that spouse's affections.

It would be a sad irony if the

Married Woman's Act, which was designed to give wives legal
independence, was held to bar loss of consortium actions, but
not alienation of affections actions arising from a wife's
exercise of her free will.
II.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD JOIN THE MAINSTREAM
OF AMERICAN LEGAL OPINION BY ABOLISHING THE TORT
OF CRIMINAL CONVERSATION, A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT
IS EVEN MORE SUBJECT TO ABUSE AND TO YIELDING
IRRATIONAL RESULTS THAN ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.
A.

The tort of criminal conversation has only
been recognized once under Utah law, in the
1959 case of Cahoon v. Pelton.

The Utah Supreme Court has only once analyzed the
question of whether a cause of action should exist in Utah for
the tort of criminal conversation.

In Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah

2d 224, 342 P.2d 94 (1959), the court recognized the existence
of a cause of action, based on the existence of the tort at
English common law, although the English tort had been
abolished long before Utah gained statehood and, in any event,
was based on the antiquated notion that a husband had a
property right in his wife.

The Utah Supreme Court

acknowledged that that notion "is contrary to the law on that
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subject as developed in this state and most, if not all, of the
states in this country."

Id., 342 P.2d at 98.

Court affirmed the cause of action.

Ld.

Even so, this

In so doing, the

court created a new basis for the tort, namely "the exclusive
right of either spouse to intercourse with the other."

Id.

Criminal conversation actions are entirely a judicial
creation in Utah.

Like alienation of affections actions,

criminal conversation actions are without any constitutional or
legislative support.

As a creature of the common law, the tort

of criminal conversation can be abolished by this Court if it
deems it advisable to do so.
B.

The main public policy arguments against
alienation of affections apply egually well
to the tort of criminal conversation.

The tort of criminal conversation suffers from the
same theoretical and practical weaknesses as the tort of
alienation of affections.

For example, criminal conversation

certainly provides at least as much opportunity for blackmail
and improperly motivated suits as does alienation of
affections.

Moreover, it is even harder to measure damages in

a criminal conversation case than in an alienation of
affections case because discernable damage to the marriage is
not a requirement of the former tort.

The jury in effect must

guess at the value of the plaintiff's hurt feelings caused by
knowing that his or her spouse had engaged in sexual relations
with defendant.

Otherwise, the measure of damages in the two
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actions is basically identical.

As a result, criminal

conversation actions are as inconsistent with the Hackford rule
barring loss of consortium damages as are alienation of
affections actions.

The primary differences between alienation

of affections and criminal conversation are twofold.

First,

sexual conduct is a prerequisite to a criminal conversation
action.

Second, criminal conversation has even fewer

safeguards than alienation of affections.
C.

The lack of recognized defenses makes
criminal conversation actions more subject
to abuse and absurd results than alienation
of affections actions.

The elements of the tort of criminal conversation, as
defined in Cahoon, appear to border on strict liability.

All

that is required for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case is proof that the defendant engaged in "adultery in
violation of the criminal law" with the plaintiff's spouse.
Id., 342 P.2d at 98-99.

It is arguably no defense that the

"guilty spouse" consented or even enticed the defendant.
342 P.2d at 98.

Id.,

Indeed, few defenses to criminal conversation

exist except for a defense based on the consent of the
plaintiff to the act.
It is precisely the irrational and inequitable strict
liability nature of this tort that has caused it to be even
more disfavored among courts and commentators than alienation
of affections.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, for
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example, recently abolished the tort of criminal conversation,
even though it apparently retains a cause of action for
alienation of affections, when it found itself in the absurd
situation of otherwise having to uphold a verdict for criminal
conversation against a wife based on her sleeping with her
husband.
In Joan Feldman v. Darlene Feldman, 125 N.H. 102, 480
A.2d 34 (1984), both the plaintiff and the defendant were
unwittingly married to the same husband.

The husband had

married the plaintiff in 1962 in New Hampshire and had fathered
three children with her.

His job required extensive travel and

he was rarely at home in New Hampshire.

He met the defendant

in Tokyo in 1970; he told her that he was divorced.

After a

period of courtship, he married the defendant in 1973,
established his home with her in Las Vegas, and had a son by
her in 1976.

All the time, the husband maintained his

relationship with his first wife and family, and neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant knew of the other one's existence.
The plaintiff learned of her husband's marriage to the
defendant in 1981.

She divorced him, and brought an action for

alienation of affections and criminal conversation against the
defendant shortly thereafter.

The trier of fact (a master)

found in favor of the defendant on the alienation of affections
claim.

The master determined that the defendant was entirely

innocent of any intent to alienate the mutual husband's
affections from the plaintiff, whom she did not know existed.
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The master found, however, that the plaintiff in a criminal
conversation action "need only prove an occurrence of sexual
intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse,
and that the only possible defense for the action is consent or
condonation by the plaintiff."

Feldman, 480 A.2d at 35.

He

therefore awarded $35,000 in damages to the plaintiff.
In reviewing the case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
agreed that the trier of fact had correctly interpreted and
applied the law of criminal conversation to the case.

I_d.

The

court disagreed, however, with the fact finder's opinion that
abolishing the tort of criminal conversation was a "legislative
function."

The court determined that it had the authority to

abolish the tort of criminal conversation:
As a common-law tort, the action for
criminal conversation is a creation of the
judiciary. Consequently, it is the duty of
the judiciary to examine it and make such
changes as justice requires when the
Legislature has chosen not to act. The
Legislature expressed its will by enacting
laws, not by failing to do so. Furthermore,
its inaction could be motivated by its
assumption that if a judicial developed rule
is unjust, the courts will overrule it. It
follows that the general rule of deference
to the legislative intent has no application
here, where the Legislature has expressed no
intent that the cause of action be retained.
Id., 480 A.2d at 35 (quotations and citations omitted).

The

New Hampshire Supreme Court thereupon abolished the cause of
action for criminal conversation, after noting that a solid
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majority of the states and the District of Columbia had already
done likewise.

Id, 480 A.2d at 35-36.

D.

Mainstream American legal opinion is even
more opposed to criminal conversation
actions than to alienation of affections
actions.

Not surprisingly, in light of the absurd results that
the tort can produce, courts are even more willing to abolish
criminal conversation on their own initiative than they are to
abolish alienation of affections.
done so.

All told, seven states have

Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Kline

v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Feldman v.
Feldman, 125 N.H. 102, 480 A.2d 34 (1984); Lynn v. Shaw, 620
P.2d 899 (Okla. 1980); Fadqen v. Lenker, 365 A.2d 147 (Pa.
1976); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981); Erwin v.
Coluccio, 32 Wash. App. 510, 648 P.2d 458 (1982).

In addition,

Louisiana long ago refused to recognize the tort, Moulin v.
Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447, 448-49 (1927), and the
recent O'Neil opinion in Idaho discussed above in connection
with alienation of affections leaves no doubt that Idaho would
join the ranks of those states that prohibit the cause of
action if it were called upon to do so.
This move to judicially abolish criminal conversation
is relatively new.

Of the nine states discussed above, all

except Louisiana have acted since 1976, at least 17 years after
the Utah Supreme Court's sole analysis of criminal conversation
in Cahoon.
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Legislatures also take a dim view of criminal
conversation actions.

Many states have legislatively abolished

the tort, 5 while other states have eliminated the right to
collect money damages.^
Even commentators who strongly support the continued
existence of a cause of action for alienation of affections
believe that the tort of criminal conversation ought to be
abolished.

For instance, one particular article, The Case for

Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with
the Marital Relationship, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer 426 (1972), was
obviously highly persuasive to the Utah Supreme Court majority
in Nelson v. Jacobsen.

It is quoted or cited in the majority

opinion at least four times in support of four different
arguments favoring the retention of a cause of action for
alienation of affections.
1217, and 1218.

Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1215, 1216,

Yet with regard to criminal conversation, the

article's author makes the following condemnation:
There is growing evidence that extramarital
sexual activity is becoming not only more
common but more acceptable, apparently even
to the partners to the marriage. In this
state of affairs the action for criminal
conversation as it now stands is largely
outdated. As has been indicated the
defendant's ignorance of the marriage does
not constitute a defense against the charge
of adultery; nor does proof that the
faithless spouse encouraged the adulterous
act. To allow recovery on the basis of the
sexual conduct alone without proof of a
resulting diminution of affections or
similar loss would leave the door open to
flagrant injustices. In other words, the
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right of the spouse flowing from the marital
relationship would no longer be conclusively
presumed to include a monopoly interest in
his or her partner's sexual intercourse.
48 Notre Dame Lawyer at 433 (the validity of the author's
position is confirmed by the absolute lack of enforcement of
Utah's adultery law, which some might suggest remains on the
books only because the Utah Legislature does not want to appear
to be encouraging extra-marital relationships by repealing
it).

Thus, even conservative commentators who favor retention

of alienation of affections actions deny the continued
viability of the rationale that the Utah Supreme Court used
thirty years ago in recognizing a cause of action for criminal
conversation.
CONCLUSION
In short, alienation of affections is an obsolete
tort.

It is based on the archaic assumption that wives are

their husband's property, unable to exercise their own free
will, and that husbands have a legal right to the continued
affection of another human being.

By contrast, under current

Utah law a husband does not even have the right to the
continuation of his marriage, much less the affections of his
spouse.

Alienation of affections actions are fraught with

practical problems.

Further, an action for alienation of

affections is basically an action for loss of consortium; Utah
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law does not allow loss of consortium damages for any other
tort (except for constitutionally mandated damages in wrongful
death cases).

As a matter of fairness, and in recognition of

the need for change and growth in the common law, Utah ought to
abolish the cause of action for alienation of affections.
Likewise, criminal conversation is no longer a viable
tort.

It is subject to gross abuse and can lead to real

injustices.

In the three decades that have passed since Utah's

only decision on the matter, legislatures, courts and
commentators (including one recently relied on by the Utah
Supreme Court in retaining alienation of affections) have
become increasingly hostile to what is perceived as an unjust
and inequitable strict liability tort.

It is now time for Utah

to join the growing ranks of states that have abolished this
outmoded cause of action.
Based on the foregoing arguments, the defendant, J.
Ralph Macfarlane, appeals to this Supreme Court for a decision
declaring that alienation of affections and criminal
conversation are no longer recognizable torts under Utah law,
and reversing Judge Roth's order denying the defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief may be Granted.
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Donald B. Holbrook

David N. Sonnenreich
Attorneys for Appellant
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ENDNOTES
1

One weakness in Justice Stewart's "power
relationship" argument is that it does not explain why a cause
of action should lie in the spouse of the victim of a power
relationship. Unwanted sexual advances by an employer are
unquestionably illegal; unwanted sexual advances by professors,
physicians, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts or psychologists are
serious violations of professional ethics that can lead to a
loss of credentials, and such advances are usually inherently
tortious under various theories. In each case a cause of
action or remedy other than alienation of affections is
available to the recipient of the advances. Of course, if an
intimate relationship develops between a person in authority
and an underling as a result of mutual attractions, that
situation is really no different from any ordinary alienation
of affections action, of the type that Justice Stewart
apparently would have abolished in Nelson. For a further
critique of the "power relationship" approach, see C. Haws,
Power Abuse as a Basis for Alienation of Affections: Nelson v
Jabobsen, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 183 (1985).
2

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-341 (Supp. 1988); Cal.
Civ. Code § 43.5 (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202
(1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572b (1987); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-923 (1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-17 (1982); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-4-4-1 (Burns 1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 167
(1981); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-301(a)(1984) ; Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 47B (West Supp. 1988); Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 27A.2901 (1988); Minn. Stat. § 553.02 (1988); Mont. Code
Ann. § 27-1-601 (1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,188 (Supp.
1988); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.380 (1986); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 14-02-06 (Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.840 (1987); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 4.06 (Supp. 1989); Va. Code § 8.01-220 (1950);
W. Va. Code § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01
(1981).
3

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West 1987)
(action permitted only if spouse was a minor or incompetent at
time of alleged alienation); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, § 170
(Purdon 1965) (action permitted only if defendant is blood
relative of plaintiff).
4

Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975) (injunction permitted,
see, Logan v. Davidson, 282 Ala. 327, 330, 211 So.2d 461, 463
(1968)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974) (abolished cause
of action for "sums of money as damages"); Fla. Stat. § 771.01
(1986) (abolished "sums of money as damages"); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 460:2 (1983) (prohibits civil actions for damages, but
see 125 N.H. 102, 480 A.2d 34 (1984) which effectively
abolished the cause of action); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A-.23-1
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(1987) (abolished action for sums of money); N.Y. Civ. Rights
Law § 80-a (McKinney 1976) (abolished action for sums of
money); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Page 1981) (Abolished
action for civil damages); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1001
(Supp. 1988) (abolished actions for sums of money); Wyo. Stat.
§ 1-23-101 (1988) (abolished action for monetary damages).
5

Ala. Code § 6-5-331 (1975); Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5
(West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202 (1987); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-572f (1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-923 (1981); Ga.
Code Ann. § 51-1-17 (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns
1986); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207, § 47B (West Supp. 1988);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2901 (1988); Minn. Stat. § 553.02
(1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,188 (Supp. 1988); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 41.380 (1986); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06 (Supp. 1987);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.850 (1981); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.05
(Supp. 1989); Va. Code § 8.01-220 (1950); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 768.01 (1981).
6

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); Fla. Stat.
§ 771.01 (1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23-1 (1987); N.Y. Civ.
Rights Law § 80-a(McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29
(Page 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1988); Wyo.
Stat. § 1-23-101 (1988).
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